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BOOK REVIEWS

Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, and Material
Objects, by Jeffrey E. Brower. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp.
xxii + 327. $ 74.00 (hardback).
BRUNO NIEDERBACHER, SJ, University of Innsbruck
In this book, Jeffrey Brower investigates Aquinas’s view of the ultimate
content and structure of the material world. He aims to reconstruct the
essential elements of this view, to locate them in the wider context of
Aquinas’s thought, and to engage this reconstruction in contemporary
metaphysical debates. The book has five parts: Part I sketches Aquinas’s
complete ontology; Part II analyses Aquinas’s theory of change in general and of the two types of change, namely substantial and accidental
change; Part III deals with hylomorphism, which is presented as a type of
substratum theory (Thomistic substratum theory), and defends it against
rival theories; Part IV spells out the precise connection between Aquinas’s
hylomorphism and his account of material objects; Part V, entitled “Complications,” deals with topics like transubstantiation, Aquinas’s view of
the nature of human beings, and some problems with Aquinas’s account
of the afterlife. Each discussion leads to refinements, extensions and modifications of Aquinas’s theory. Thus the reader is led on an exciting path
through an ontology of material objects that becomes increasingly differentiated and sophisticated. In this review I cannot do justice to the richness and subtlety of Brower’s explorations. I can only touch roughly on a
few main topics and formulate a few remarks.
Any presentation of Aquinas’s ontology must be a reconstruction, for
Aquinas did not write a cohesive ontology or metaphysics. Brower’s reconstruction tries to be faithful to textual evidence, has in view the bigger
picture of Aquinas’s thought more generally, and accepts the challenge of
figuring out a coherent account of seemingly inconsistent passages. The
reconstruction centers on hylomorphism, the view that material objects
are compounds of matter and form. The question it addresses is: How
does Aquinas understand the terms “matter,” “form,” and “compound”?
Brower approaches hylomorphism from the perspective of Aquinas’s
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theory of change, focusing mainly on the text De principiis naturae and the
first book of the Sententia super Physicam. Change requires the existence
of something that is changed. According to Brower, matter is that which
endures in change, while form is that with respect to which the matter is
changed. Thus, he initially proposes a functionalist understanding of the
terms “matter,” “form,” “composition,” and “inherence.” The terms “potency” and “actuality” are initially also seen as functional concepts that
“provide us with an alternative way of describing the functional roles that
Aquinas associates with matter and form” (67). One might think that such
a functional reading indicates an antirealist understanding of the relevant
items. But it does not. Brower defends a realist understanding of matter,
form, and compound. For beings “of all three types are required . . . to explain the occurrence of any given change” (62). Since there are two types of
change, accidental and substantial, one of the thorny questions that arises
is: What exactly is the matter that endures in cases of substantial change?
Brower says that the endurer is prime matter, and he ascribes to Aquinas
four assumptions concerning it: prime matter is a type of being that (i)
can be re-identified over time, (ii) can be compounded and divided, (iii) is
infinitely divisible, and (iv) is atomless. According to Brower, prime matter is non-individual gunky stuff, that is, a kind of stuff the parts of which
are all such as to have proper parts. This interpretation is, of course, highly
contentious, and Brower tries to show that Aquinas’s characterization
of prime matter as pure potentiality is compatible with it. According to
Brower, Aquinas does not claim that prime matter lacks actuality in some
way (namely via inherence), but only that it lacks actuality through itself
(123). Another contentious doctrine that Brower associates with Aristotle
and Aquinas is the doctrine of numerical sameness without identity. He
introduces the doctrine first in the context of accidental change: distinct
hylomorphic compounds such as the accidental unities white-Socrates and
intellectually-educated-Socrates are distinct, but share a common parent substance. Or, a particular lump of bronze and a statue are the same material
object but are distinct hylomorphic compounds. Later on, Brower engages
the notion of numerical sameness without identity in order to show its potential to solve the so-called problem of material constitution (as it arises
in such puzzles known as the Debtor’s Paradox, the Ship of Theseus, the
Body-Minus Argument, the Statue and the Lump) and in order to define
material objects. Accordingly, “to be a material object is to be numerically
the same as a hylomorphic compound possessing prime matter—that is a
material substance or a material unity” (222). The last three chapters of
the book deal mainly with Aquinas’s anthropology. According to Brower,
human beings are a very special sort of compound: a compound of prime
matter, on the one hand, and a sui generis type of particular, namely a
human soul that is capable of existing without being enmattered, on the
other. He calls this view “Thomistic dualism.” The two substances comprising this dualist partnership are (i) the compound, namely a particular
human being, say, Socrates; and (ii) an immaterial substance, in this case
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Socrates’s soul. Brower further develops the relationship between these
two dualist components by considering a problem concerning the sort of
existence a person has after death but before bodily resurrection. Some interpreters, called “cessationists,” ascribe to Aquinas the view that Socrates
ceases to exist when he dies and comes to existence again when his body
is resurrected. Others, called “survivalists,” think that, according to Aquinas, Socrates must survive his death. Brower shows the problems of both
interpretations and makes a new suggestion: “insofar as Socrates retains
his soul as a proper part, he can be said to survive his death as an individual substance of a rational nature, and hence as a person. The important point, however, is that insofar as Socrates’s soul ceases to be united
with any matter, Socrates himself cannot be said to survive his death as a
human being” (292). In this interim-state Socrates is a human person that
is naturally disposed to be a human being. This disposition will be actualized when Socrates’s soul is united with matter. Then he will be an actual
human being again.
So far I have briefly presented some of the book’s main topics. Here are
some critical remarks:
1. With respect to textual evidence, some texts that are used as evidence
for some theses might not support them as clearly as Brower seems to
intend. Two examples: First, Aquinas writes in De ente et essentia: “But
the definition of natural substances contains not only form, but matter
as well.” Brower comments: “As Aquinas insists here, and reiterates elsewhere, the nature or essence of material substances must be said to include both matter (in the sense of prime matter) and form (in the sense of
substantial form)” (201). However, in my view, Aquinas is speaking here
not of prime matter. For according to Aquinas the definition of a human
being would have to include flesh and bones—and if there were a definition of Socrates it would have to include these bones and this flesh. Second, Brower uses a passage of the Commentary on the Metaphysics as direct
evidence for the doctrine of numerical sameness without identity: “those
things are one in number whose matter is one. . . . Indeed, it is on account
of matter that a singular thing (singulare) is both one in number and divided from other things” (In Meta. 5.8.876). Brower reads matter-sharing
here as prime matter-sharing. However, the sentence which Brower leaves
out of the quotation makes clear that Aquinas is not speaking about prime
matter but about matter under determinate dimensions. He says: “For
matter insofar as it is under determinate dimensions [dimensionibus signatis] is the principle of individuation of the form.”
2. With respect to matter and form as metaphysical parts, Aquinas
speaks sometimes of matter and form as metaphysical parts that constitute
a compound. However, one can also find passages where he is reluctant
in using such terminology. Aristotle thinks that such terms as “synthesis” or “composite of matter and form” can be misleading, claiming that
“the proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one
actually, and the other potentially.” Aquinas comments on this that “the
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proximate matter, that is the one that is appropriated to the form, and the
form itself are the same. For the one of the two is it as potency, the other
as act” (In Meta. 8.5.1767). And in his Sententia libri De anima (2.1.234) he
writes: “that matter is united to form is the same as matter is actualized.”
These passages suggest that Aquinas does not in fact consider matter and
form to be real metaphysical parts.
3. With respect to prime matter as stuff that can be re-identified, there
certainly are contexts that suggest that Aquinas is committed to such a
view, especially contexts elucidating his account of formal substantial
change, and also his view of the resurrection of bodies that are numerically identical with bodies that lived once and decayed. Such an identity
would seem to presuppose that there are portions of prime matter that can
be re-identified. On the other hand, in De Principiis Naturae he writes that
prime matter “dicitur una numero in omnibus . . . Dicitur etiam aliquid
unum numero, quia est sine dispositionibus quae faciunt differre secundum numerum”; i.e., that prime matter is numerically one in all means
here that it “is without dispositions which make it differ in number.” In
my view, this passage excludes the thesis that there are portions of prime
matter that can be re-identified over time. Aquinas is not saying that there
are “distinct portions of prime matter” which have a kind of “intrinsic
unity” (114), but rather that prime matter as a whole has this unity.
4. Brower illustrates ordinary substantial change with the example of the
generation of a human being. Such change involves several compounds:
one compound that is generated (a human being, such as Socrates), and
other compounds that are corrupted (the sperm and the ovum). (For present purposes we may presuppose the correctness of this description.) The
compounds sperm and ovum and the compound Socrates overlap with
respect to their matter, which is, according to Brower, prime matter. But
might Aquinas not be using “matter” in the sense of proximate matter,
that is, formed matter that has the potential to take on a new substantial
form? Surely, in this case there would be no endurer. But as Brower makes
clear in his discussion of transubstantiation, substantial change does not
necessarily involve an endurer that survives the actualization of a potentiality. “In order for the relevant sort of potentiality to get actualized, it is
sufficient for there to be a substratum that becomes something else” (240).
This conception of substantial change would be free of the contentious
assumption of the existence of prime matter as re-identifiable stuff.
These critical remarks are not intended to give a devaluing impression.
Brower’s book is clearly and precisely written with well-articulated theses and definitions. Many helpful figures illustrate the text. A glossary of
technical terms at the end is very handy for keeping track of the various
senses in which Aquinas uses these terms. Brower has delivered a philosophical masterpiece of thoroughness and successful creative engagement
with a classical author. It gives both Aquinas scholars and contemporary
metaphysicians much “gunkless stuff” to think about for many hours.

